

Comparison of Gaussian and Lagrangian Plume Modeling of Doses for Guidance in Microreactor Physical Protection System Design

2022 International MACCS User Group
September 20, 2022

Jeffrey Wang*, Shaheen Dewji

Nuclear and Radiological Engineering and Medical Physics Programs

Georgia Institute of Technology

* E-mail: jeffreywang@gatech.edu



Georgia Tech  George W. Woodruff School of Mechanical Engineering

Outline

- Objectives
- Background: Review of NRC Regulations on Siting
 - Current 10 CFR 50.34 and 50.47
 - Future 10 CFR 53 Subpart D – Siting
- Methodology
 - Overview of SOARCA's Peach Bottom Unmitigated LTSBO
 - Scope of Simulation
- Results
 - Comparison of Gaussian and Lagrangian Air Concentrations
 - Resulting Peak ICRP 60 Effective Dose at Radial Distances
- Conclusion and Application to Micro and SMR Licensing
- Next Steps




Peach Bottom BWR Units 2 and 3
- Constellation Energy Nov 2010

Objectives

- Working alongside Texas A&M to develop a **risk informed consequence driven** Physical Protection System (PPS) appropriate for micro and SMRs.
 - Texas A&M is creating a plausible accident scenario in MELCOR for a heat pipe micro reactor
- Goal is to enable a more appropriately sized PPS for advanced reactor designs while maintaining constant or reduced risk associated with future reactor constructions.
- Improve safety of surrounding population with dose-based **risk informed** boundaries rather than empirically defined distances
- **Reduce** initial construction and recurring operating **costs** for plant operators

Emergency Planning Zones



Emergency Planning Zones – NRC
Emergency Preparedness Maps

Background: NRC – 10 CFR 50.34 and 10 CFR 50.47 (1980)


- 50.34 – Describes general EPZ radius surrounding a facility
 - 10 miles for plume exposure, 50 miles for ingestion pathways
 - Determined from a conservative estimate that in worst case scenario no immediate life-threatening doses will occur
- 50.47 – Requires that Total Effective Dose Equivalent at exclusion zone boundary cannot exceed 25 rem after two hours, 25 rem total at low population boundary
 - Simulation consists only of external exposure, TEDE will be **ICRP 60 ED using EPA FGR 15 coefficients**
 - Focusing on scalable EPZ radii using 1 rem threshold, 25x less than maximum allowable

Background: NRC – Preliminary 10 CFR 53 Rulemaking (2022)

- Currently in the **early stages** of CFR 53 drafting and rulemaking
 - Ongoing discussions on changes to requirements in site boundaries and possible variable sizes depending on risk informed analysis
- Facility EPZs licensed under § 53 no longer are set at 10-mile radii
 - Instead under § 53.1309, EPZs are drawn to meet the standards designated by § 53.855
 - Primarily informed by "**radiological consequences** from a hypothetical, unmitigated event... [resulting] in offsite doses below the values in § 53.210"
 - Dose thresholds being 25 rem TEDE as described in § 50.47
 - However, for better safety, the following examples will use a **1 rem threshold**

Methodology: SOARCA Peach Bottom Unmitigated LTSBO Scenario

- Following an earthquake, plant experiences total loss of offsite power
- Onsite AC power sources are degraded
 - Backup diesel generators fail to start
 - Onsite DC batteries provide enough to supply 4 hours of shutdown operations
- Upon exhaustion of DC battery capacity, emergency cooling systems shut down and core experiences runaway heating and a release
- **No mitigation** of accident progression beyond that required in § 50.54 (hh).
 - Further mitigation can include obtaining and connecting offsite functioning generators and extending RCIC lifetime to 24 hours




Radial 10 (Red) and 50 (Blue) Mile EPZ
– Google Maps

Methodology: Scope of Simulation and Parameters

- CFR 50.34 and current § 53.855 specify that TEDE cannot exceed 25 rem for a representative individual standing at the boundary
 - Results are **not population weighted**
 - **Only early consequence from external exposure simulated**
- Inventories of plume released are representative of the 1.3 GWe BWR reactors located at Peach Bottom, not an advanced reactor design
- Two separate days were simulated: Dec 15, 2015 and May 27, 2021
 - December date selected arbitrarily for a normal, if slightly cloudy, winter week
 - May date selected for the slight amount of precipitation over the week
 - Weather history obtained from NOAA's NAM 12km gridded data sets


Results: Gaussian and Lagrangian Plume Winter Weather

Current: Dec 17 11:45 AM
Elapsed: 53hr 45min 40sec




Gaussian

Current: Dec 17 01:00 PM
Elapsed: 55hr 00min 40sec



Lagrangian

Tue, Dec 15




Weather in Lancaster PA
– TimeAndDate.com

Results: Radial Distance Peak ICRP 60 Effective Dose Winter

Peak ICRP60 ED at Radial Distance

External Exposure Only





Lag. EPZ


Gau. EPZ


Results: Gaussian and Lagrangian Plume Spring Weather

Current: May 29 10:30 AM
Elapsed: 52hr 30min 40sec




Gaussian

Current: May 29 11:00 AM
Elapsed: 53hr 00min 40sec



Lagrangian




Weather in Lancaster PA
– TimeAndDate.com

Results: Radial Distance Peak ICRP 60 Effective Dose Spring

Peak ICRP60 ED at Radial Distance

External Exposure Only



↑
Lag. EPZ


↑
Gau. EPZ

Conclusion: Application in SMR and Microreactor Licensing

- Distributions displayed in the previous two scenarios were representative of a release from a large 4,016 MWth (1,382 MWe) BWR
- SMRs and microreactors range below 100 MWe with **proportionally less** fuel mass that could be released during an unmitigated incident
- 10 CFR 53 contains language **explicitly** allowing for situations where EPZ radii could be designated at facility boundary
 - Resulting in **no emergency planning** beyond that required for safe operation of the nuclear power plant
 - No requirements for community emergency drills, distribution of potassium iodide, and the corresponding costs for planning and preparation
 - **"Reconsider establishing the emergency planning zone at the site boundary, which, among other concerns, can significantly limit the ability of the public to establish standing to challenge siting..."**

Next Steps

- Analysis of microreactor scenario
 - Texas A&M is developing a MELCOR scenario for an unmitigated accident using INL Heat Pipe Reactor Design A
- This work is a **subset** of a larger risk informed Physical Protection System
 - Improvements in PPS simulated in PathTrace result in changes to MELCOR accident progression for as input into MACCS
- Include **internal dose** assessment for a more comprehensive boundary comparison



Current floor plan of HPR facility in PathTrace. White trail is fastest hostile path to accessing critical infrastructure.

References

- 10 C.F.R. § 50.34 (2020). Subsection (a)(ii)(D)(1) and (a)(ii)(D)(2)
- 10 C.F.R. § 50.47 (2020). Subsection (c)(2)
- 10 C.F.R. § 50.54 (2020). Subsection (hh)
- 10 C.F.R. § 53.210 (May 2022). Iteration 2 of Framework A.
- 10 C.F.R. § 53.855 (May 2022). Iteration 2 of Framework A.
- 10 C.F.R. § 53.1309 (May 2022). Iteration 2 of Framework A.
- Leute, Jennifer, et al. "MACCS (MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System) User Guide Version 4.0." United States: N. p., 2021. Web. doi:10.2172/1821556.
- Bixler, Nathan, et al. "State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses Project Volume 1: Peach Bottom Integrated Analysis." NUREG/CR-7110, Sandia National Laboratories: Albuquerque, NM. May 2013. [ML13150A053]
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission. "Part 53 Risk-Informed, Technology-Inclusive Regulatory Framework for Advanced Reactors Rulemaking – Subpart D Rule Language." Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Washington, DC. March 17, 2021. [ML21076A083]